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Abstract
With machine learning models being used for
more sensitive applications, we rely on inter-
pretability methods to prove that no discriminat-
ing attributes were used for classification. A po-
tential concern is the so-called "fair-washing" -
manipulating a model such that the features used
in reality are hidden and more innocuous features
are shown to be important instead.
In our work we present an effective defence
against such adversarial attacks on neural net-
works. By a simple aggregation of multiple ex-
planation methods, the network becomes robust
against manipulation. This holds even when the at-
tacker has exact knowledge of the model weights
and the explanation methods used.
1. Introduction
In recent years machine learning algorithms have become
more complex and are used for more important decisions.
Since models, especially neural networks, are trained with
large amounts of data, it is hard to oversee just what is
hidden in the data and what correlations the model picks
up on. Explainability methods present a solution for this
(Hansen & Rieger, 2019). By looking at what features of the
input were important for a classification, we can make sure
that the classification is aligned with our ethical convictions
and understanding of the task.
It follows that there are many reasons why someone might
want to manipulate an explanation, referred to as "fairwash-
ing" (Aïvodji et al., 2019). For example, a company may
want to hide that they use discriminatory practices in their
hiring or someone may want to hide adversarial attacks on
machine learning algorithms. Before explainability methods
can be used and relied on in practice, we need to evaluate the
the risk for this and find effective defences. Previous works
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Figure 1. Explanation methods (here Guided Backpropagation) are
very vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Our method, AGG-Mean,
presents a simple but effective defence.
have shown that explainability methods are remarkably brit-
tle against adversarial attacks. In practice, an attacker can
effectively manipulate the explanation at will without any
visual changes to the input that a human would pick up on
(Dombrowski et al., 2019; Ghorbani et al., 2019).
We propose a simple way to ward against this potential
security risk and make explainability methods more viable
in deployment. Our approach is motivated by a key insight
in machine learning: Ensemble models can reduce both
bias and variance compared to applying a single model. A
related approach was pursued for functional visualization in
neuroimaging (Hansen et al., 2001). Based on this insight,
we propose a way to aggregate explanation methods, AGG-
Mean. This approach is analysed theoretically and evaluated
empirically. In experiments on Imagenet, the aggregate is
more robust to adversarial attacks than any single method.
Even when the attacker has complete knowledge of the
model weights and the explanation methods to be used as
well as complete control over the input, the explanation
stays robust as shown in Fig. 1.
2. Related Work
2.1. Explanation methods
The open problem of explainability is reflected in a lot of
recent work (Kindermans et al., 2017; Selvaraju et al., 2017;
Bach et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2018a; Zhou et al., 2016;
Ancona et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Rieger et al., 2018;
Kim et al., 2018; Lundberg & Lee, 2017; Zintgraf et al.,
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2017; Simonyan et al., 2013; Zeiler & Fergus, 2014; Sel-
varaju et al., 2017; Smilkov et al., 2017; Sundararajan et al.,
2017; Shrikumar et al., 2017; Montavon et al., 2017; Chang
et al., 2018). We focus on generating visual explanations
for single samples. To our knowledge the first work in this
direction was Simonyan et al. (2013) with Saliency Maps
(SM) that proposed backpropagating the output onto the in-
put to gain an understanding of a neural network decision.
The relevance for each input dimension is extracted by tak-
ing the gradient of the output w. r. t. to the input. This idea
was extended by Springenberg et al. (2014) into Guided
Backpropagation (GM) by applying ReLU non-linearities
after each layer during the backpropagation. Compared to
Saliency, this removes visual noise in the explanation. Grad-
CAM (GC) from Selvaraju et al. (2017) is an explanation
method, developed for use with convolutional neural net-
works. By backpropagating relevance through the dense
layers and up-sampling the evidence for the convolutional
part of the network, the method obtains coarse heatmaps
that highlight relevant parts of the input image. Integrated
Gradients (IG) Sundararajan et al. (2017) sums up the gradi-
ents from linearly interpolated pictures between a baseline,
e.g. a black image, and the actual image. SmoothGrad (SG)
filters out noise from a basic saliency map by creating many
samples of the original input with Gaussian noise (Smilkov
et al., 2017). The final saliency map is the average over all
samples. In concurrent work, (Bhatt et al., 2020) also pro-
posed aggregating explanation methods, albeit with the goal
of decreasing complexity rather than vulnerability. Finally,
(Yeh et al., 2019) showed that a combination of two popular
explanation methods is optimal in terms of fidelity.
2.2. Adversarial attacks on explanation methods
While adversarial examples for classification are well-
known, recently there has been growing interest in adversar-
ial manipulation of explanations (Ghorbani et al., 2019; Heo
et al., 2019; Dombrowski et al., 2019). Attacks on expla-
nation can serve multiple purposes including "fairwashing"
(Aïvodji et al., 2019). All of these methods exploit the
fully differentiable nature of neural networks and iteratively
update the input (or the model weights) to change the expla-
nation while only minimally changing the input and output.
The goal is to manipulate the explanation while keeping the
input and output (visually) similar. It is assumed that the
network architecture and weights are known and that either
the input ((Ghorbani et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2018b; Dom-
browski et al., 2019)) or the network weights (Heo et al.,
2019) can be changed by the attacker.
Focussing on changing the input, Ghorbani et al.
(2019),Zhang et al. (2018b) and Dombrowski et al. (2019)
attack the explanation by manipulating the image, not chang-
ing the network weights. Interestingly, Zhang et al. (2018b)
discuss the transferability of attacks and conclude that at-
tacks are not that transferable. If the attacker is allowed
to modify networks weights, as in Heo et al. (2019), the
attacks generalize to all the considered explanation meth-
ods. We are interested in the more realistic situation where
the attacker can modify the input but not the network. We
investigate the transferability, c.f., Zhang et al. (2018b), and
hypothesise that the limited transferability leads to improved
robustness of the ensemble explanation. While ensemble
methods have been proposed earlier as a defense for attacks
on the label (Tramèr et al., 2017), they have not previously
been investigated as a defense mechanism against attacks
on explanations.
3. Averaging explanation methods to reduce
vulnerability
3.1. Averaging explanations
All currently available explanation methods have weak-
nesses that are inherent to the approach and include sig-
nificant uncertainty in the resulting heatmap (Kindermans
et al., 2017; Adebayo et al., 2018; Smilkov et al., 2017).
A natural way to mitigate this issue and reduce noise is to
combine multiple explanation methods. Ensemble methods
have been used for a long time to reduce the variance and
bias of machine learning models. We apply the same idea
to explanation methods and build an ensemble of explana-
tion methods. Ensemble methods have also been previously
used to defend against adversarial attacks on neural network
outputs (Pang et al., 2019; Liao et al., 2018), motivating the
usage of an explanation ensemble to defend against attacks
on the explanation.
We assume a neural network F : X 7→ y with X ∈
Rm×m and a set of explanation methods {ej}Jj=1 with
ej : X, y, F 7→ E with E ∈ Rm×m. We write Ej,n for the
explanation obtained for Xn with method ej and denote the
mean aggregate explanation as e¯ with E¯n = 1J
∑J
j=1Ej,n.
While we assume the input to be an image ∈ Rm×m, this
method is generalizable to inputs of other dimensionalities
as well.
To get a theoretical understanding of the aggregation, we
hypothesize the existence of a ’true’ explanation Eˆn. This
allows us to quantify the error of an explanation method as
the mean squared difference between the ’true’ explanation
and an explanation procured by an explanation method, i.e.
the MSE.
For clarity we subsequently omit the notation for the neural
network. We write the error of explanation method j on
image Xn as errj,n = ||Ej,n − Eˆn||2 with
MSE(Ej) =
1
N
∑
n
errj,n
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and MSE(E¯) = 1N
∑
n ||E¯n − Eˆn||2 is the MSE of the
aggregate. The typical error of an explanation method is the
mean error over all explanation methods
MSE =
1
J
∑
j
MSE(Ej).
With these definitions we can do a standard bias-variance
decomposition (Geman et al., 1992). Accordingly we can
show the error of the aggregate will be less that the typical
error of explanation methods,
MSE = 1N
∑
n
1
J
∑
j ||Eˆn − Ej,n||2 (1)
= 1N
∑
n ||Eˆn − E¯n||2 (2)
+ 1NJ
∑
n,j ||E¯n − Ej,n||2,
hence,
MSE = 1J
∑
j
1
N
∑
n ||E¯n − Ej,n||2 + MSE(E¯) (3)
≥ MSE(E¯).
A detailed calculation is given in the appendix. The error of
the aggregate MSE(E¯) is less than the typical error of the
participating methods. The difference - a ‘variance’ term -
represents the epistemic uncertainty and only vanishes if all
methods produce identical maps. By taking the average over
all available explanation methods, we reduce the variance of
the explanation compared to using a single method. To ob-
tain this average, we normalize all input heatmaps such that
the relevance over all pixels sum up to one. This reflects our
initial assumption that all individual explanation methods
are equally good estimators. We refer to this approach as
AGG-Mean.
EAGG-Mean,n =
1
J
J∑
j=1
Ej,n (4)
3.2. Adversarial scenarios
With the increasing interest and practical importance of
explainability of neural networks the interest in methods for
manipulation and control of explanations is also increasing.
A typical scenario is to make imperceptible changes to the
input of the neural network such that the output/label is
unchanged while the explanation changes according to a
given goal. Such effort could, e.g., be used to hide bias or
other fairness issues a given classifier might have.
Dombrowski et al. (2019) showed that explanations can be
made more robust by replacing the ReLU nonlinearity with
a Softplus function. However, this requires changing the
network and using a different architecture for classification
and explanation, which is highly undesirable as it defeats
the purpose of the explanation. The analysis of Zhang et al.
(2018b) showed that transferability of attacks is limited,
hence, our ensemble of multiple explanations may offer
robustness also towards certain types of adversarials.
In the following we will assume an attacker who has full
knowledge of the neural network, including the architecture
and weights. In contrast to Heo et al. (2019), however,
we will assume that the attacker cannot change the neural
network, following Dombrowski et al. (2019); Ghorbani
et al. (2019). Furthermore the attacker has full control over
the input to the neural network. The goal is to adversarially
manipulate the image according to a predefined objective.
In the following, x will refer to the original image. xˆ is the
’target’ image. The objective is to produce an adversarial in-
put x′ with x′ ≈ x but the explanation Ex′ ≈ Exˆ. While we
focus on assimilating the explanation map of another input
as in Dombrowski et al. (2019), all techniques introduced
can be readily adapted to other objectives, f.e. to move the
mass center of the explanation.
Exploring the robustness of aggregates of multiple explana-
tion methods we concentrate on the following two scenarios:
Arsenal of explanation methods In this scenario we
have a pool of potential explanation methods. The attacker
does not have knowledge of what explanation method is
used and optimizes for a different explanation method than
is used by the defender. The success of the attack depends
on how readily an attack of one explanation method trans-
lates to another method.
We hypothesize that attacks on explanation methods are
fragile and do not translate well across explanation meth-
ods, as they exploit locally high variances in the gradient
landscape. This hypothesis is examined in Section 3.2.
Aggregation of explanation methods In this more chal-
lenging scenario we aggregate multiple explanation methods
as described in Eq. (4). The attacker knows the exact expla-
nation methods and ratio going into the mixture and attacks
this aggregation.
Many attribution-based methods are utilizing the gradient
δy
δx (x) of the output to create an explanation. Due to the
non-linearity of the neural network, the gradient can change
rapidly with small distances in input space (Dombrowski
et al., 2019; Ghorbani et al., 2019). Attacks on explanation
methods exploit this vulnerability.
4. Experiments
We evaluate how robust aggregated methods are against
adversarial attacks, compared to unaggregated methods. In
all cases we assume that the attacker has full knowledge of
the network architecture and weights (white box attack) but
cannot change them. However, the attacker has full control
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over the input.
Following (Dombrowski et al., 2019) we run experiments
on a pretrained VGG161 We consider Layerwise Relevance
Propagation (LRP), Saliency Mapping (SM), Guided Back-
prop (GB) and Integrated Gradients (IG) as explanation
methods. The latter was not used in the aggregation.
Unless otherwise noted we followed (Dombrowski et al.,
2019) in the choice of hyperparameters for attacking expla-
nation methods. In the appendix we show that our defence
also works against the attack as proposed in Ghorbani et al.
(2019).
Since the ReLU function used in neural networks is not
twice differentiable, we replace it with a differentiable ap-
proximation, SoftPlus for the iterative creation of the ad-
versarial input. The final manipulated heatmaps are created
with the ReLU non-linearity. Further details about the ex-
periments are in the appendix.
We consider the two scenarios introduced in Section 3.2.
In all cases, the objective of the attacker is to make the
explanation of input Ex′ ≈ Exˆ while keeping x′ ≈ x. To
do this, the attacker manipulates x′.
We visually confirmed that the adversarial images look simi-
lar to the input images and provide examples in the appendix.
We measure the difference between the start explanation Ex,
target explanation Exˆ and adversarial explanation Ex′ with
the MSE (Mean Square Error), the PCC (Pearson Corre-
lation Coefficient) and the top-k intersection with k being
ad-hoc set to 10% (Dombrowski et al., 2019; Ghorbani et al.,
2019).
In all metrics, explanations obtained with different methods
have different ’base’ values (similarity between the expla-
nations of two randomly chosen images) due to structural
differences between explanation methods. To account for
this, we consider for each similarity metric msim the differ-
ence msim(Exˆ, Ex′)−msim(Exˆ, Ex), i.e. how much more
similar the attack makes Ex′ look to Exˆ. For the MSE, this
results in a negative score, since the difference between the
target and the attack is less than between the target and the
starting point. For all metrics, the ideal score is 0, i.e. the
attack did not change the explanation at all. Thus, for MSE
a high value is desirable, for PCC and top-k union a low
value is desirable.
Transferability of attacks on explanation methods Vi-
sually comparing the success of an attack on AGG-Mean
on the y-axis compared to unaggregated method (Guided
Backprop) on the x-axis. Similarity metrics (topK and PCC)
should be low, MSE should be high for less similarity be-
tween target and adversarial. Since for most samples topK
1Models retrieved from https://github.com/keras-team/keras.
Figure 2. Attacking one method does not translate to attacks on
the other methods. Similarity metrics (topK and PCC) should be
low, MSE should be high. Since for most samples topK and PCC
are higher for the attacked method (Guided Backprop) than for
LRP, attacks on Guided Backprop do not translate well to LRP.
Red dot is the single sample visualized in Fig. 3
and PCC are lower for AGG-Mean than for Guided Back-
prop, AGG-Mean is more robust than Guided Backprop.
The red dot is the sample visualized in Fig. 4.
The lack of transferability results are in line with the findings
of (Zhang et al., 2018b).
Figure 3. Adversarial attacks do not transfer well between expla-
nation methods. The adversarial input was calculated to attack GB
(upper row). We then extracted the explanation with LRP (lower
row). The attack does not transfer well to LRP. To visualize details
better we clipped values at the 99th percentile.
We consider a case where the attacker does not know what
explanation method is used, i.e. we attack a different expla-
nation method than the one that is used. This would be the
case if the defender has not made the specific explanation
method used public or is choosing one at random to ward
off attacks. If the attack translates well, i.e. the image ma-
nipulation fools both methods, similarity metrics should be
similar for both explanation methods.
In Fig. 2 we provide results for attacking Guided Back-
propagation and extracting an explanation with LRP. For a
hundred samples we visualize for each sample the respective
similarity metrics for both explanation methods in Fig. 2.
If the attack translates well, the points should lie on the
identity line in Fig. 2. Samples below the identity line for
PCC and topK and above for MSE indicate that the attack
does not generalize to other explanation methods.
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Figure 4. Attacking explanation methods. Each method is targeted individually. AGG-Mean visibly preserves original explanation best,
thus being the most resistant to adversarial attacks. To visualize details better we clipped values at the 99 percentile. We provide the
adversarial input images in the appendix.
As visible in Fig. 2 and anecdotally in Fig. 3 (red data point
in Fig. 2), attacks perform much worse on other methods
(here LRP) than the targeted one (here GB). We provide
statistics for other combinations in the appendix.
Attacking aggregations of explanation methods In the
second scenario the attacker knows that the explanations are
aggregated and attacks the aggregation. We aggregate LRP,
GB and SM and compare against those methods as well as
Integrated Gradient. IG was not included in the aggregation
as it requires sampling for each step, making it computation-
ally much more expensive than the other methods.
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Figure 5. Visually comparing the success of an attack on AGG-
Mean (y-axis) to the unaggregated method Guided Backprop (x-
axis). Similarity metrics (topK and PCC) should be low, MSE
should be high for less similarity between target and adversarial.
Since topK and PCC are lower for AGG-Mean than for Guided
Backprop, AGG-Mean is more robust than Guided Backprop. Red
dot is sample visualized in Fig. 4.
In Table 1 we provide metrics averaged over a hundred
samples. AGG-Mean outperforms unaggregated methods.
We also provide a direct comparison to GuidedBackprop
in Fig. 5. To give an intuition on what differences in the
metrics look like, we visualize a sample (red dot in Fig. 5) in
Fig. 4. We see that AGG-Mean opposed to the unaggregated
methods largely preserves the original heatmap after the
attack. More examples are provided in the appendix.
The resilience of the aggregate to attacks can be under-
stood in terms of averaging induced smoothness. In (Dom-
browski et al., 2019) the beneficial effects of averaging in
the SmoothGrad method are described. As noted in (Dom-
browski et al., 2019) SmoothGrad is computationally ex-
pensive. We conjecture that the diversity of the methods
involved in the present aggregate implies that smoothing
can be achieved at less computational effort.
5. Conclusion
In recent times, attacks on explanation method have received
increased attention as the so-called "fairwashing", manipu-
lating explanations to more innocuous ones, has become a
concern.
We provide a simple and intuitive approach to defend against
such attacks that does not require the model to be changed in
any way and is computationally inexpensive. This approach
is explored theoretically. We then provided experimental
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Table 1. Evaluation scores across methods and architectures on a
hundred samples. AGG-Mean surpasses all considered methods in
all metrics. All SE ≤ 0.02.
MSE (*10E-9) PCC TOP 10% UNION
METHOD
SM -0.92 0.74 0.40
GB -3.25 0.77 0.42
LRP -1.45 0.81 0.49
IG -1.76 0.82 0.47
AGG-MEAN -0.89 0.54 0.24
evidence that aggregations are a more robust to adversarial
manipulation than individual explanation methods.
Perhaps surprisingly, a simple average with the originally
attacked method included induces a more robust explana-
tion than replacing the explanation method with a different
one. In (Dombrowski et al., 2019) arguments are presented
that the observed vulnerability is due to non-smoothness of
contemporary networks. It is also argued that averaging as
in SmoothGrad increases robustness. We theorize that the
averaging of the diverse set of explanation methods involved
in the aggregate creates similar smoothness. We noted that
in contrast to (Dombrowski et al., 2019), the aggregate does
not require modification (smoothing) of the network.
We hope that our approach will be useful to make neural
networks more transparent and increase their credibility as
they are applied in real-life scenarios.
A simple defense against adversarial attacks on heatmap explanation
References
Adebayo, J., Gilmer, J., Muelly, M., Goodfellow, I., Hardt,
M., and Kim, B. Sanity checks for saliency maps. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp.
9525–9536, 2018.
Aïvodji, U., Arai, H., Fortineau, O., Gambs, S., Hara, S.,
and Tapp, A. Fairwashing: the risk of rationalization.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.09749, 2019.
Ancona, M., Ceolini, E., Oztireli, C., and Gross, M. To-
wards better understanding of gradient-based attribution
methods for deep neural networks. In 6th International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2018),
2018.
Bach, S., Binder, A., Montavon, G., Klauschen, F., Müller,
K.-R., and Samek, W. On pixel-wise explanations for
non-linear classifier decisions by layer-wise relevance
propagation. PloS one, 10(7):e0130140, 2015.
Bhatt, U., Weller, A., and Moura, J. M. Evaluating and
aggregating feature-based model explanations. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.00631, 2020.
Chang, C.-H., Creager, E., Goldenberg, A., and Duvenaud,
D. Explaining image classifiers by counterfactual genera-
tion. 2018.
Dombrowski, A.-K., Alber, M., Anders, C. J., Ackermann,
M., Müller, K.-R., and Kessel, P. Explanations can be
manipulated and geometry is to blame. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.07983, 2019.
Geman, S., Bienenstock, E., and Doursat, R. Neural net-
works and the bias/variance dilemma. Neural computa-
tion, 4(1):1–58, 1992.
Ghorbani, A., Abid, A., and Zou, J. Interpretation of neural
networks is fragile. In Proceedings of the AAAI Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence, volume 33, pp. 3681–3688,
2019.
Hansen, L. K. and Rieger, L. Interpretability in intelligent
systems–a new concept? In Explainable AI: Interpreting,
Explaining and Visualizing Deep Learning, pp. 41–49.
Springer, 2019.
Hansen, L. K., Nielsen, F. Å., Strother, S. C., and Lange, N.
Consensus inference in neuroimaging. NeuroImage, 13
(6):1212–1218, 2001.
Heo, J., Joo, S., and Moon, T. Fooling neural network
interpretations via adversarial model manipulation. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.02041, 2019.
Kim, B., Wattenberg, M., Gilmer, J., Cai, C., Wexler, J.,
Viegas, F., et al. Interpretability beyond feature attribu-
tion: Quantitative testing with concept activation vectors
(tcav). In International Conference on Machine Learning,
pp. 2673–2682, 2018.
Kindermans, P.-J., Hooker, S., Adebayo, J., Brain, G., Alber,
M., Schütt, K. T., Dähne, S., Erhan, D., and Kim, B.
The (un)reliability of saliency methods. In Proceedings
Workshop on Interpreting, Explaining and Visualizing
Deep Learning (at NIPS), 2017.
Liao, F., Liang, M., Dong, Y., Pang, T., Hu, X., and Zhu, J.
Defense against adversarial attacks using high-level rep-
resentation guided denoiser. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
pp. 1778–1787, 2018.
Lundberg, S. M. and Lee, S.-I. A unified approach to in-
terpreting model predictions. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pp. 4765–4774, 2017.
Mohseni, S. and Ragan, E. D. A human-grounded evaluation
benchmark for local explanations of machine learning.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.05075, 2018.
Montavon, G., Lapuschkin, S., Binder, A., Samek, W., and
Müller, K.-R. Explaining nonlinear classification deci-
sions with deep taylor decomposition. Pattern Recogni-
tion, 65:211–222, 2017.
Pang, T., Xu, K., Du, C., Chen, N., and Zhu, J. Improving
adversarial robustness via promoting ensemble diversity.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08846, 2019.
Ribeiro, M. T., Singh, S., and Guestrin, C. Why should i
trust you?: Explaining the predictions of any classifier.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international
conference on knowledge discovery and data mining, pp.
1135–1144. ACM, 2016.
Rieger, L., Chormai, P., Montavon, G., Hansen, L. K., and
Müller, K.-R. Structuring Neural Networks for More
Explainable Predictions. pp. 115–131. Springer, Cham,
2018.
Selvaraju, R. R., Cogswell, M., Das, A., Vedantam, R.,
Parikh, D., and Batra, D. Grad-cam: Visual explanations
from deep networks via gradient-based localization. In
2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision
(ICCV), pp. 618–626. IEEE, 2017.
Shrikumar, A., Greenside, P., and Kundaje, A. Learning
important features through propagating activation differ-
ences. In International Conference on Machine Learning,
pp. 3145–3153, 2017.
A simple defense against adversarial attacks on heatmap explanation
Simonyan, K. and Zisserman, A. Very deep convolu-
tional networks for large-scale image recognition. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1409.1556, 2014.
Simonyan, K., Vedaldi, A., and Zisserman, A. Deep In-
side Convolutional Networks: Visualising Image Clas-
sification Models and Saliency Maps. dec 2013. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6034.
Smilkov, D., Thorat, N., Kim, B., Viégas, F., and Watten-
berg, M. Smoothgrad: removing noise by adding noise.
06 2017.
Springenberg, J., Dosovitskiy, A., Brox, T., and Riedmiller,
M. Striving for simplicity: The all convolutional net. In
ICLR (workshop track), 2014.
Sundararajan, M., Taly, A., and Yan, Q. Axiomatic attribu-
tion for deep networks. In International Conference on
Machine Learning, pp. 3319–3328, 2017.
Tramèr, F., Kurakin, A., Papernot, N., Goodfellow, I.,
Boneh, D., and McDaniel, P. Ensemble adversar-
ial training: Attacks and defenses. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
Yeh, C.-K., Hsieh, C.-Y., Suggala, A., Inouye, D. I., and
Ravikumar, P. K. On the (in) fidelity and sensitivity of
explanations. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, pp. 10967–10978, 2019.
Zeiler, M. D. and Fergus, R. Visualizing and understand-
ing convolutional networks. In European Conference on
Computer Vision, pp. 818–833. Springer, 2014.
Zhang, Q., Nian Wu, Y., and Zhu, S.-C. Interpretable con-
volutional neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
pp. 8827–8836, 2018a.
Zhang, X., Wang, N., Shen, H., Ji, S., Luo, X., and Wang,
T. Interpretable deep learning under fire. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.00891, 2, 2018b.
Zhou, B., Khosla, A., Lapedriza, A., Oliva, A., and Torralba,
A. Learning deep features for discriminative localization.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 2921–2929, 2016.
Zintgraf, L. M., Cohen, T. S., Adel, T., and Welling, M.
Visualizing deep neural network decisions: Prediction
difference analysis. In ICLR, pp. 3, 2017.
A simple defense against adversarial attacks on heatmap explanation
A. Appendix
A.1. Aggregating explanation methods to reduce variance - detailed derivation
All currently available explanation methods have weaknesses that are inherent to the approach and include significant noise
in the heatmap (Kindermans et al., 2017; Adebayo et al., 2018; Smilkov et al., 2017). A natural way to mitigate this issue
and reduce noise is to combine multiple explanation methods. Ensemble methods have been used for a long time to reduce
the variance and bias of machine learning models. We apply the same idea to explanation methods and build an ensemble of
explanation methods.
We assume a neural network F : X 7→ y with X ∈ Rmxm and a set of explanation methods {ej}Jj=1 with ej : X, y, F 7→ E
with E ∈ Rmxm. We write Ej,n for the explanation obtained for Xn with method ej and denote the mean aggregate
explanation as e¯ with E¯n = 1J
∑J
j=1Ej,n. While we assume the input to be an image ∈ Rmxm, this method is generalizable
to inputs of other dimensions as well.
We define the error of an explanation method as the mean squared difference between a hypothetical ’true’ explanation
and an explanation procured by the explanation method, i.e. the MSE. For this definition we assume the existence of the
hypothetical ’true’ explanation Eˆn for image Xn.
For clarity we subsequently omit the notation for the neural network.
We write the error of explanation method j on image Xn as errj,n = ||Ej,n − Eˆn||2 with
MSE(Ej) =
1
N
∑
n
errj,n
and MSE(E¯) = 1N
∑
n ||E¯n− Eˆn||2 is the MSE of the aggregate. The typical error of an explanation method is represented
by the mean
MSE =
1
N
∑
n
1
J
∑
j
||Eˆn − Ej,n||2
=
1
NJ
∑
n,j
||Eˆn − Ej,n + E¯n − E¯n||2
=
1
NJ
∑
n,j
||(Eˆn − E¯n) + (E¯n − Ej,n)||2
=
1
NJ
∑
n,j
||Eˆn − E¯n||2 + ||E¯n − Ej,n||2 + 1
NJ
∑
n,j
(
2Tr
[
(Eˆn − E¯n)(E¯n − Ej,n)
])
=
1
N
∑
n
||Eˆn − E¯n||2 + 1
NJ
∑
n,j
||E¯n − Ej,n||2 + 2 1
N
∑
n
Tr
(Eˆn − E¯n)
 1
J
∑
j
(E¯n − Ej,n)

=
1
N
∑
n
||Eˆn − E¯n||2 + 1
NJ
∑
n,j
||E¯n − Ej,n||2 + 2 1
N
∑
n
Tr
(Eˆn − E¯n) 1J
∑
j
(E¯n − Ej,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

=
1
N
∑
n
||Eˆn − E¯n||2 + 1
NJ
∑
n,j
||E¯n − Ej,n||2,
hence,
MSE = MSE(E¯) +
1
NJ
∑
n,j
||E¯n − Ej,n||2︸ ︷︷ ︸
epistemic uncertainty
≥ MSE(E¯)
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The error of the aggregate MSE(E¯) is less than the typical error of the participating methods. The difference - a ‘variance’
term - represents the epistemic uncertainty and only vanishes if all methods produce identical maps.
A.2. Experimental setup
A.2.1. GENERAL
For AGG-Var, we add a constant to the denominator. We set this constant to 10 times the mean std, a value chosen empirically
after trying values in the range of [1, 10, 100] times the mean.
Evaluations were run with a set random seed for reproducibility. SE were reported either for each individual result or if they
were non-significant in the caption to avoid cluttering the results.
All experiments were done on a Titan X.
A.2.2. IMAGENET
We downloaded the data from the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge website and used the validation set
only. No images were excluded. The images were preprocessed to be within [−1, 1] unless a custom range was used for
training (indicated by the preprocess function of keras).
A.2.3. DETAILS ABOUT ATTACKING EXPLANATION METHODS
For a range of explanation methods we chose to compare against LRP, Gradient, Guided Backpropagation and Integrated
Gradients, a range of well-known and well-established explanation methods (Sundararajan et al., 2017; Bach et al., 2015;
Springenberg et al., 2014; Simonyan et al., 2013). Since Integrated Gradients is thirty times more computationally expensive
than other methods, we did not include it in the aggregation as it would have slowed down experiments considerably.
Unless otherwise noted, all metrics are computed as the average of a hundred data samples with mean and SE. Informally,
we also found that the MSE does not align well with perceived changes in the explanations, likely due to it being susceptible
to outliers.
We used a pretrained VGG16 for all experiments attacking explanation methods (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014).
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A.3. Alignment between human attribution and explanation methods
We want to quantify whether an explanation method agrees with human judgement on which parts of an image should be
important. While human annotation is expensive, there exists a benchmark for human evaluation introduced in (Mohseni &
Ragan, 2018). The benchmark includes ninety images of categories in the ImageNet Challenge (ten images were excluded
Figure 6. Example images from (Mohseni & Ragan, 2018) with human-annotated overlays.
due to the category not being in the ImageNet challenge) and provides annotations of relevant segments that ten human test
objects found important. Example images are shown in Fig. 6.
While human evaluation is not a precise measure, we still expect some correlation between neural network and human
judgement.
To test the alignment, we calculate the cosine similarity,
similarity(ej) =
∑N
n=1AnEj,n√∑N
n=1A
2
n
√∑N
n=1E
2
j,n
between the human annotation and the explanations produced by the respective explanation methods. An is the human
annotation of what is important for image Xn
Since the images in this dataset are 224x224 pixel large, we only compute the cosine similarity for the network architectures
where pretrained networks with this input size were available.
We see that AGG-Mean and AGG-Var perform on-par with the best methods (SmoothGrad and GradCAM). While the
aggregated methods perform better than the average explanation method, they do not surpass the best method.
When we combine the two best-performing single methods, SmoothGrad and GradCAM, we surpass each individual method.
We hypothesize that this is because the epistemic uncertainty is reduced by the aggregate.
Table 2. Cosine similarity between heatmap and human annotated benchmark. All SE below 0.05
RESNET101 RESNET50 VGG19
METHOD
AGG-MEAN 0.63 0.66 0.64
AGG-VAR 0.66 0.68 0.67
GB 0.42 0.49 0.47
GC 0.60 0.62 0.60
IG 0.45 0.45 0.47
MEAN(SG+GC) 0.69 0.70 0.65
SG 0.63 0.65 0.59
SM 0.45 0.45 0.47
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A.4. Details about attacking explanation methods
Choice of explanation methods We focused on explanation methods that have previously been shown to be susceptible to
adversarial attacks. As such, we did not include GradCAM in the experiments, neither as a comparison or in the aggregation.
Different explanation methods have different computational loads. Notably, SmoothGrad and IntegratedGradients involve
the sampling of many explanations for a single pass, increasing computation times by the number of samples () and were not
included in the aggregation but as a comparison.
Choice of hyperparameters We followed (Dombrowski et al., 2019) for the choice of hyperparameters in learning rate
and beta growth. For AGG-Mean we chose a learning rate of 10−3 and 1500 iterations for the attack.
hyperparameter choice when attacking explanation methods, using a learning rate of 10−3.
A.4.1. MORE EXAMPLES
We provide more examples showing different explanation methods being attacked in Figs. 7 to 10. An abridged version of
Fig. 7 is also shown in the main text.
Figure 7. Attack shown in the main text, including the adversarial input images. There are no visual differences for any of the adversarial
inputs.
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Figure 8. Appendix example 1
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Figure 9. Appendix example 2
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Figure 10. Appendix example 3
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A.4.2. TRANSFERABILITY OF ATTACKS
In the main text we show similarity metrics differences between the method being attacked and not being attacked for
Guided Backprop and LRP. Here we provide scatter plots for the rest of the considered methods in Figs. 11 to 14:
Figure 11. Integrated Gradient as starting method
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Figure 12. Gradient as starting method
Figure 13. LRP as starting method
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Figure 14. GuidedBackprop as starting method
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A.4.3. SIMILARITY OF THE ATTACKED IMAGES TO THE STARTING IMAGES
We provide the average distance of the adversarial images to the original images in Table 3 (calculated in RGB space,
average over all pixels). As can be seen in Figs. 7 to 9 and 10, there is no visual difference to the input images for any of
the attacks. Attacking AGG-Mean has the smallest distance to the input image, supporting our hypothesis that aggregating
explanation methods removes vulnerabilities to adversarial manipulation.
Table 3. Evaluation scores across methods and architectures on a hundred samples, including similarity of the resulting image to the
starting image. Deviation is SE.
MSE ∆ (*10E-9) PCC TOP 10% UNION MSE ON IMAGES
METHOD
SM -0.92 ± 0.00 0.74 ± 0.01 0.40 ± 0.01 0.0027 ± 0.0002
GB -3.25 ± 0.02 0.77 ± 0.01 0.42 ± 0.01 0.0110 ± 0.0025
LRP -1.45 ± 0.01 0.81 ± 0.01 0.49 ± 0.01 0.0047 ± 0.0006
IG -1.76 ± 0.01 0.82 ± 0.01 0.47 ± 0.01 0.0102 ± 0.0022
AGG-MEAN -0.89 ± 0.01 0.54 ± 0.01 0.24 ± 0.01 0.0013 ± 0.0001
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A.4.4. OTHER ATTACKS
In the main text we mainly concern ourselves with making the explanation of one image look like a pre-specified target
explanation, as this is a use case where the motivation of an attacker is apparent. However, as introduced in (Ghorbani et al.,
2019) other attack objectives are also conceivable.
We show results when following the objective of making a specified area of the explanation not relevant, i.e. a blank space in
the explanation as introduced in (Ghorbani et al., 2019). A square (in size a quarter of the image) centered on the middle
should not contain any relevance for the explanation. Size and position of the blank space were chosen ad-hoc, we assume
that the center of the image generally contains useful information for the classification. We show quantitative results in
Table 4, computing how much percentage of the original relevance is preserved and qualitative results in Figs. 15 and 16.
While an aggregation is not completely robust to the attack, far more of the original explanation is preserved.
Table 4. Manipulating explanations to show a blank (irrelevant) square. Aggregating explanation methods preserves far more of the
original explanation than any single method.
START AFTER ATTACK PERCENTAGE
METHOD
SM 0.34 2.05E-02 0.06
GB 0.41 7.57E-03 0.02
IG 0.38 1.48E-02 0.04
LRP 0.37 4.11E-03 0.01
AGG-MEAN 0.37 5.10E-02 0.14
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Figure 15. Attacking explanation methods to make an area irrelevant as in (Ghorbani et al., 2019). AGG-Mean is most robust.
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Figure 16. Attacking explanation methods to make an area irrelevant as in (Ghorbani et al., 2019). AGG-Mean is most robust.
